In this paper, we survey some quantitative and qualitative approaches to uncertainty management based on possibility theory and present a logical framework to integrate them. The semantics of the logic is based on the Dempster's rule of conditioning for possibility theory. It is then shown that classical modal logic, conditional logic, possibilistic logic, quantitative modal logic and qualitative possibilistic logic are all sublogics of the present logical framework. In this way, we can formalize and generalize some well-known results about possibilistic reasoning in a uniform semantics. Moreover, our uniform framework is applicable to nonmonotonic reasoning, approximate consequence relation formulation, and partial consistency handling.
Introduction
There are essentially two kinds of logical formalisms for reasoning about possibility and necessity. On the one hand, the quantitative approach represents numerical possibility and necessity of logical formulas in the language directly. The most remarkable cases of this approach are possibilistic logic (PL, 18] ) and quantitative modal logic (QML, 34] ). For example, in PL, the well-formed formulas (f Nc) and (f c) denote that the necessity and the possibility of the sentence f are greater than or equal to c respectively.
On the other hand, the qualitative approach represents the relative magnitude of possibility degrees between two formulas. For example, in the representative case qualitative possibility logic (QPL, 12] ), the w f g means the possibility degree of f is greater than or equal to that of g. It is shown that QPL is equivalent to a system of conditional logic. Obviously, in the quantitative approach, we can not represent the comparative possibility or necessity between di erent formulas, whereas in the qualitative approach, we can not reason about the numerical uncertainty directly. Thus, it is intended to have a uniform formalism that can integrate both kinds of logics. In this paper, we will propose a logic for conditional possibility(LCP) that can serve the purpose.
A Mini-survey
In this section, we will review some logics for reasoning about possibility and necessity. These include modal logic, conditional logic, possibilistic logic, quantitative modal logic and qualitative possibility logic. However, the rst step is to x a propositional language. The syntax of the propositional language is as follows:
Modal logic
Just like many branches of logics, the origin of modal reasoning can be traced back to the Aristotelian age. However, the rst modern logic system for reasoning about possibility and necessity appeared in 1912 32] . Since then, modal logic have received much attention from philosophical logicians. After the publication of Kripke's in uential paper on the semantics of modal logics 30], the notion of possible worlds have been associated with modal logic closely. In addition to its philosophical interest, modal logic have also been applied to program veri cation (e.g. temporal logic and dynamic logic), AI (epistemic logic) and other elds of computer science 27, 26, 43] .
We will introduce the syntax and possible world semantics for classical modal logic in what follows. Only the essential of modal logic will be touched upon. For more detail, the readers can see the introductory textbook 9].
To form the w s of modal logic, a new unary connective 2 is added to propositional logic and an additional rule for formation of modal formulas is needed: if f is a w , then 2f is, too. Furthermore, :2:f is abbreviated as 3f.
A possible world model for modal logic is a triplet M = hW; R; V i, where W is a set of possible worlds, R W W is a binary relation called accessibility relation on W, and V : PV ! 2 w assigns to each propositional symbol in PV a subset of W. If R satis es the condition that for all w 2 W there exists u 2 W such that (w; u) 2 R, then the model is called serial. Given if f = g _ h; fw : 8u((w; u) 2 R ) u 2 jgj M )g if f = 2g: A formula f is satis able i there exists M such that jfj M 6 = ;, and is valid in M i jfj M = W. The subscript M will be dropped when it is clear from the context. We use M j = f to denote f is valid in M. Let S be a set of w s, then S j = D f i for all serial models M, if for all g 2 S, M j = g, then M j = f. Also let D denote the set of w s f such that j = D f holds.
Conditional logic
The original purpose of conditional logic is to provide a formal tool for the analysis of subjunctive conditional in natural language 39]. Recently, there have been a number of applications of conditional logic to nonmonotonic reasoning and belief revision in AI research 29, 22] .
The syntax of conditional logic is an extension of the propositional language with a binary connective ! and the following formation rule, if f and g are w s, then f ! g is also a w .
As for the semantics, there are some competitive paradigms which lead to di erent systems of conditional logics 39]. The one most closely related to possibilistic reasoning is the system-of-spheres semantics proposed by Lewis 33] . According to the reformulation in 7], we describe a system-of-spheres model (smodel) of conditional logic as a tuple M = hW; ( w ) w2W ; V i, where W and V is the same as in the possible world models for modal logic, and for each w 2 W, w W W is a binary relation (called preference relation) on W satisfying almost re exivity, transitivity, almost connectedness, and nonvacuity 1 . Intuitively, a world u is more possible (preferred, closer) than v from the viewpoint of an agent in w if v w u. The set W w = def fuj9v; v w ug is called the accessible worlds from w. The worlds not in W w are considered impossible from w. Then, according to Ramsey test, f ! g is true in w i an agent in w comes to accept g when it revises its belief to accommodate f. Therefore, in addition to the de nition of truth set for classical connectives, we can de ne jf ! gj = fw : W w \ jfj = ; or 9u 2 W w \ jfj8v(u w v ) v 2 jf gj)g The de nition of satis ability and validity is the same as above. For any set of w s S and w f, S j = V N f is de ned as S j = D f except that serial models are replaced by s-models. Let VN also denote the set of w s such that j = V N f holds. Conversely, if a possibility measure is given that satis es the two properties, then the possibility distribution corresponding to can be de ned as (w) = (fwg) for all w 2 W.
Just like in probability theory, we can consider the de nition of conditional possibility distribution. However, how to de ne it is still controversial. In 2], the following de nition from 17] is adopted. Given a subset A of W, the conditional possibility distribution is de ned as 
and if (A) = 0, we will de ne (xjA) = 1 for all x 2 W.
Since in our logic, the necessity measure of a proposition will be interpreted as epistemic uncertainty of some agent, we prefer (2) that is the conditioning rule for consonant beliefs as indicated in 41]. Furthermore, by (2) , the logic LCP we will introduce can be easily extended to accommodate the belief function model. We need only replace possibility distributions by basic probability assignments 41] in the semantics and modify the satisfaction clauses appropriately, then the probabilistic logic formulas introduced in 20] can be represented in our logic. In section 5.1, we will also see that the de nition facilitates the representation of Goldszmidt and Pearl's system Z + 24] in our logic.
Another reason that we adopt (2) is that it is technically more appropriate than (1). According to (1) , ( jA) is still a normalized possibility distribution on A when A is a nite and nonempty subset of W. However, if W is in nite, it is possible that A is an in nite subset of W such that (A) < 1 and for all x 2 A, (x) < (A). In this case, we will have (WjA) = (AjA) = def sup x2A (xjA) = (A) < 1, so ( jA) is no longer normalized. Since in the following logics, the universe will be the set of possible worlds that may be in nite, we consider (1) inappropriate. From now on, when we mention conditional possibility, we will refer to the de nition (2). Note that our presentation of PL is di erent with the original one proposed by Dubois and Prade. We will analyze the di erence and prove the two presentations are technically equivalent in the following.
Possibilistic logic
First, from the syntactic aspect, PL is just the propositional part of PL2 de ned in ( 16] , p.474). However, since the extension of the base logic L to rst order logic is straightforward, the di erence is not essential. The main di erence is thus the semantic one. Let denote the set of all interpretations for L. Then a model for PL2 is just a possibility distribution on . For the possibility and necessity measures and N induced by , the satisfaction relation is de ned by j = (f Nc) , N(jfj) c and j = (f c) , (jfj) c; where jfj is now the set of all propositional models of f.
If is a PL2 model, then M = h ; ; V i is a PL model, where V (p) = f! 2 j ! j = pg for all p 2 PV . Obviously, we have j = f i jfj M = for any PL2 w f. On the other hand, given a PL model M = hW; ; V i, we can de ne V u as the propositional interpretation associated with u 2 W from the truth assignment V . Then let M be a possibility distribution on de ned as M (!) = supf (u) j V u = !; u 2 Wg; where we assume sup ; = 0 by convention. We can show that jfj M = W i M j = f for any PL w f. Therefore, the semantics for PL and PL2 are equivalent in a technical sense.
Nevertheless, the philosophical meaning of a world and an interpretation is quite di erent. In general, the w s in L describes the objective facts of a world, so two worlds may coincide in the objective aspect and di erent in the others. From an epistemic or doxastic perspective, it is natural to consider a possibility distribution as an agent's view (with uncertainty) on the worlds. Since an agent may have di erent views in two worlds with the same objective facts, the semantics for PL is more general to re ect the situation. Of course, the di erence is irrelevance when we are reasoning only about the agent's beliefs on the objective world instead of nested beliefs. This is why the semantics for PL and PL2 are equivalent when we only consider the possibilistic logic formulas.
Recently, the semantics for possibilistic logic has been generalized to handling partial inconsistency 16, 15] . In the inconsistency-tolerant semantics, an absurd interpretation ! ? is added to , then ? = f! ? g, and a PL2 model is just a possibility distribution^ on ? . The absurd interpretation is de ned such that ! ? j = f for all f 2 L. Our main results may be generalized to the inconsistency-tolerant setting. However, for simplicity, we exhibit only the basic semantics now, and the general consideration will be deferred to Sec. 5.3.
Quantitative modal logic
Though PL is useful in reasoning about an agent's uncertain beliefs, it is not suitable for introspective agents, i.e., the agents reasoning about the beliefs of itself. For example, we may want to represent the following sentence about a re ective agent:
The agent consider it completely possible that what he believes with half certainty is wrong.
The sentence can be represented easily in modal logics as 3(2p^:p) if the term \half certainty" is replaced by \complete certainty".
By the analogy between necessity (resp. possibility) measure and the modal operator 2 (resp. 3) indicated in 18], it is reasonable to express the sentence as
2 )^:p) 1): However, since PL does not allow the nested use of necessity and possibility operators, it is illegal in PL. Although there is no essential di culty in generalizing the syntax of PL to cover these cases, the semantics of PL seems somewhat restrictive. Since only a single possibility distribution is associated with a PL model, the semantics corresponds to the so-called absolute semantics in 38]. It can be easily checked that the w such represented is unsatis able in the absolute semantics, though the situation described by the sentence is intuitively possible.
However, since possibility distributions re ect the epistemic states of some agent, just as the accessibility relations in modal logic do, it is very likely that in di erent possible worlds, the agent has di erent epistemic states. Thus, we can associate with each possible world a possibility distribution independently. Then we can get a kind of variable semantics 38]. This motivates the proposal of quantitative modal logic (QML).
In QML, to represent nested necessity and possibility measures, we adopt a less cumbersome notation that is compatible with modal operators. In fact, QML can be viewed as a logic with multi modal Though QML is motivated by an epistemic or doxastic interpretation of possibilistic reasoning, the system QD may be not su ciently strong for reasoning about uncertain beliefs. Some further constraints on R, such as transitivity and symmetry may be imposed on R to re ect the properties of uncertain beliefs. However, the technical details are beyond the scope of the paper, so we will concentrate on the most basic QML systems QD and refer the interested readers to 35].
Qualitative possibility logic
While PL and QML reason about the possibility and necessity degrees of the w s, qualitative possibility logic (QPL) 12] concerns mainly the relative comparison of possibility measures between two w s.
The syntax of QPL is an extension of propositional language with a binary connective \ " and the following formation rule.
if f and g are w s, then f g is also a w . The w \f g^:(g f)" is abbreviated as \f > g".
Although QPL is proposed without accompanied formal semantics, the semantics for QML can be used here, too. Given such a model as above, let w denote the possibility measure corresponding to w . Then jf gj = fw : w (f) w (g)g:
The de nition of satis ability and validity follows directly, and we denote the consequence relation by j = QPL .
The Logic LCP
In the above-mentioned logics, QML can represent the possibility and necessity degrees of w s directly, however the relative magnitude of possibility measures between two w s can not be expressed. Conversely, we can not express the quantitative aspect of possibility theory in QPL. Sometimes, it may be useful to express the quantitative and qualitative information in a sentence. For example, h0:8if^:h0:5i + g f g may be meaningful from a semantic viewpoint. However, neither QML nor QPL have the expressive power.
It is suggested that each w in QPL can be translated into one in QML in 12]. In that paper, a multimodal logic PL P is proposed based on a parameter set P 0; 1]. The syntax and semantics of PL P is same as those for QML except that the modal operators c] and hci are restricted to c 2 P. When P is nite, a translation scheme is suggested. Assume P = fc 1 ; c 2 ; : : :; c n g such that 0 c 1 < c 2 < : : : < c n 1, then Tr is a mapping from the w s of QPL to those of PL P such that Tr(p) = p for all p 2 PV ,
and Tr is homomorphic with respect to classical connectives. However, this translation scheme is not completely faithful from the viewpoint of our semantics. In fact, we can easily imange a QPL model (or QML model since these two are same) and a possible world such that f g is false in w, while Tr(f g) is true there. This can be achieved when there exists i such that c i+1 > w (g) > w (f) > c i . Thus, if we want to express the quantitative and qualitative information in a sentence, the two logics must be combined. It is not too hard to put QPL and QML together since the two language have the same semantics. We need only allow both and quantitative modal operators in our combined language and add both formation rules to those for propositional language, then the de nition of QML (or QPL) models can be used for the semantics of the combined language. Though this is an easy solution to enhance the expressive powers of both language, we can nd an even more general language. To completely exploit the power of the QML semantics and conditional possibility theory, we can de ne a logic for conditional possibility. In this language, we can not only express w s of both QPL and QML, but also reason about the conditional possibility of some w given another w . The logic is rst proposed in 36] and some preliminary results appear there.
Syntax and semantics
We need two types of conditional connectives: In the next section, we will explore the relationship between LCP and the logics described above.
LCP as a Uniform Framework
To show that LCP is expressive enough for possibilistic reasoning, let us present some translation lemmas in this section. Let L 1 and L 2 be two logics with sets of w s L 1 and L 2 respectively. If L 1 and L 2 are constructed from the same set of propositional variables, then a translation mapping from L 1 to L 2 is : L 1 ! L 2 satisfying the following classical morphism conditions:
Recall that a model for conditional logic is called an s-model. In what follows, we will call the models for QML, QPL, or LCP p-models (for possibility models) and those for modal logic d-models (for the system D). Furthermore, a model for PL is called an a-model (for absolute models).
QML and LCP
The logic most closely related to LCP is QML, since the former is just a direct generalization of the latter to the conditional version. Let us consider the translation mapping 1 from QML to LCP. The mapping 1 satis es, besides (i){(iii), the following two requirements:
?! 1 (f). Lemma 1 Let M be any p-model, then for any w f of QML, we have jfj M = j 1 (f)j M . Proof: Since the fuzzy accessibility relation for p-model is serial, we have w (f) = w (fj>) for each possible world w. The result then follows from an induction on the structure of w s. 2 Proposition 1 Let S be a set of w s in QML and f be a QML w , then S j = QD f i 1 (S) j = LCP 1 (f).
QPL and LCP
Another logic having the same class of models with LCP is QPL. The translation mapping 2 from QPL to LCP satis es the following requirement:
?! 2 (f)). Lemma 2 Let M be any p-model, then for any w f of QPL, we have jfj M = j 2 (f)j M . Proof: By induction on the complexity of w s. The only nonclassical case is jf gj. By induction hypothesis, we let jfj M = j 2 (f)j M = A and jgj M = j 2 (g)j M = B. Then w 2 jf gj i w (A) w (B) i w (AjA B) = 1 i w 2 j 2 (f g)j. 2 Proposition 2 Let S be a set of w s in QPL and f be a QPL w , then S j = QPL f i 2 (S) j = LCP 1 (f).
QPL and conditional logic
Unlike QML and QPL, conditional logic has di erent semantic models with LCP. However, by a transformation between numerical and ordinal scales, we can transform these two kinds of models into each other 3 . Consequently, we can prove the translation results between QPL and conditional logic.
First, let us consider the translation mapping 3 from QPL to VN that satis es the following requirement: In 12], an axiomatic system for QPL is given and it is shown that the system is equivalent to an axiomatization of VN. More precisely, let`Q PL and`V N denote the binary provability relation in the respective systems, then for any set S of QPL w s and QPL w f, S`Q PL f i 3 (S)`V N 3 (f). Since the completeness of VN axiomatization has been established 33, 7] , as a byproduct of Proposition 3, we have the completeness theorem of the QPL system with respect to the current semantics.
Proposition 4 Let S be a nite set of QPL w s and f be a QPL w , then S j = QPL f i S`Q PL f.
On the other hand, we can translate conditional w s into QPL ones. The translation mapping 4 satis es
By using the same model transformation as above, we can prove the following results. 
LCP and conditional Logic
We can provide a translation mapping from conditional logic to LCP by the composition of 4 
Modal and conditional Logics
The relationship between modal and conditional logic has been explored by Lewis 33] . He shows that the modal operators of the system D can be translated into the inner or outer modalities of VN. 
PL and QML
It is pointed in 34] that QML is a common generalization of PL and modal logic. The preceding subsection shows the translation mappings from modal logic to QML. In this subsection, a translation mapping from PL to QML will be given. However, because the syntax of PL is rather restrictive 4 , we can de ne the translation mapping directly without the need of conditions (i){(iii).
De ne 8 such that 8 ((fNc)) = c]f and 8 ((f c)) = hcif. Then it is easy to prove the following result.
Proposition 9 Let S be a set of PL w s and f be a PL w , then S j = PL f i 8 (S) j = QD 8 (f).
Summary
The results presented in this section may be summarized in Figure 1 . Each node of the graph is labeled by a kind of logic, and each arrow between two nodes represents a (class of) translation mapping(s) between them. Since the node labeled LCP is reachable from all nodes of the graph, many important logics for reasoning about possibility and necessity can be represented in the LCP framework. In other words, LCP is the most expressive one among all logics described in this paper.
Now, we will consider some examples that utilize the expressive power of LCP. Since we have shown that all the above-mentioned logics can be expressed in LCP, we will freely use the w s of all these logics in our examples. First, we can represent it as fhci(p q); hdipg. In fact, the representation use only the expressive power of PL. Second, we can use a slight extension of PL to encode it as fp hciq; hdipg. From the two representations, we can derive only the trivial information about the possibility of q, i.e., h0iq. However, if we encode it as fp hci ?! q; hdipg by utilizing the full expressive power of LCP, then we can derive the quite reasonable result, hc diq, i.e., it is fairly possible that John is in the basketball team, since (q) (p^q) c (p) c d.
Example 2 Continuing the last example, if we have now the additional information
It is more possible that Peter is in the basketball team than that John is, then we can add a QPL w r q to our knowledge base where r means that Peter is in the basketball team, and the result hc dir is also derivable. Example 3 Let p and q denote \Smoking causes lung cancer" and \John will give up smoking" respectively. We will give our modal operators c] a doxastic interpretation, so the fuzzy relation on the semantics of LCP will be imposed at least the transitivity constraint. These examples show the general applications of LCP. In addition to these, we will investigate two particular applications of LCP in the next section.
Applications and Generalization
In this section, we consider two application of our framework and its generalization to handing of inconsistent information.
Formulation of nonmonotonic inference relations
Since the pioneering works of Gabbay 21] was published, there have been vast amounts of literatures on the topic about the properties of general nonmonotonic inference relations. One of the most important among them is the work by Kraus et al. 29, 31] . They introduce the following properties for a nonmonotonic inference relation j . Let f; g; h be w s of the propositional language L throughout this and the next subsections.
(R) f j f (LLE) j = f g; f j h g j h (RW) j = f g; h j f h j g (CM) f j g; f j h f^g j h (AND) f j g; f j h f j g^h (OR) f j h; g j h f _ g j h (RM) f j h; f 6 j :g f^g j h The system is called R. Let us call f j g a positive sequent(p-sequent) and f 6 j g a negative sequent(nsequent), and assume that S is a set of sequents and A is a p-sequent, then we write S`R A i there is a derivation 5 of A from S by the axiom and inference rules in R.
In 10], a general translation scheme from nonmonotonic inference relations to conditional logics is provided. According to the scheme, denoted by here, (f j g) = f ! g and (f 6 j g) = :(f ! g). In the above formulation of nonmonotonic reasoning, a conditional f ! g is considered as a default, read as \Typically, f is g", and all defaults are supposed to have the same degree of strength. Thus the result in the last proposition is also applied to the 0-entailment of Pearl's system Z 2]. However, the quantitative aspect of LCP allows us to distinguish the di erent degrees of strength for defaults. This corresponds exactly to Goldszmidt and Pearl's system Z + 24].
In 24], a default is of the form (f ; g; n), where f; g 2 L and n is a positive integer 6 . Note that we restrict n to be a positive integer instead of just a nonnegative one as in 24] because this will induce the existence of the least speci c a-model for a set of defaults in the following presentation. Let = f(f i ; g i ; n i )g be a set of defaults and assume the base language L is nite. An interpretation ! is said to verify f i ; g i if ! j = f i^gi , to falsify it if ! j = f i^: g i , and to satisfy it if ! j = f i g i . Now, a ranking function is a assignment of nonnegative integers to the interpretations of L. A ranking function is said to be admissible relative to if it satis es minf (!) j ! j = f i^gi g + n i minf (!) j ! j = f i^: g i g; for every (f i ; g i ; n i ) 2 . Note that since n i is positive, we can use instead of < in the above inequality. A set is consistent if there exists an admissible for to . It is shown that if is consistent, then the following mutual recursive equations give the minimum admissible ranking + for .
De nition 1 There is a slight di erence between the present de nition and the original one, where + (!) = maxfZ + (r i ) j ! j = f i^: g i g + 1. We can use the present de nition because all n i 's are positive. We can now de ne the 0 and 1-entailment for Z + system.
De nition 2 Let be a set of defaults and (f ; g; n) be a default, 1. 0-entails (f ; g; n), denoted by j = 0 (f ; g; n), i all ranking functions admissible to are also admissible to f(f ; g; n)g. Proof: This follows from the facts that 1. + is the minimum admissible ranking for 24], 2. + is the least speci c possibility distribution satisfying ( ), and 3. + is the solution of Def. 3, so is equal to + . Thus all three types of similarity-based consequence relations can be formulated in LCP as w s valid in a special model. However, the main advantage of logics is that we can do reasoning without involving a particular model. For example, in 14](Theorem 1), it is claimed that j = K;1 1 is just the classical logic consequence relation. However, the claim is just wrong when R is the universal relation (i.e. R(!; !) = 1 for all ! 2 ). Therefore, by using object level reasoning in LCP, we can reformulate the generic graded entailment relations. Let Q5( ) denote the class of all p-models having -similarity accessibility relations, S be a set of w s in LCP and A be a w in LCP, then S j = Q5( ) A i for all p-models M 2 Q5( ), M j = S implies M j = A. The system Q5(min) is just abbreviated as Q5. De nition 4 Let K L, f; g 2 L, and c 2 0; 1], then 1. f j K;c 1 g i K j = Q5 f hcig, 2. f j K;c 2 g i K j = Q5 (f g _ hcig), and 3. f j K;c 3 g i K j = Q5 ((f f^g) _ hci(f^g)), are respectively the type I, II, and III generic graded entailment relations.
Though the de nition is only for the similarity relations based on the t-norm min, the semantics of LCP allows us to generalize the de nition to any t-norms. However, the development of the general logics will be left as further research.
We observe that the graded entailment relations de ned above do not utilize the expressive power of nested modalities. However, some axioms of Q5( ) system involving nested use of modalities indeed re ect the properties of similarity relations. Intuitively, w j = hcif means that the world w is similar to the f-worlds at least to the extent c (or in short, w is c-similar to f-worlds). Dually, w j = c]f means w is discernible with :f-worlds to the extent c or w is c-characterized by f. Now, three characteristic axioms of Q5( ) correspond to the three properties of similarity relations. First, the schema T f h1if says that a world satisfying f is completely similar to f-worlds. This re ects the re exivity. Second, the schema 4 hcihdif hc dif corresponds to transitivity, that says a world c-similar to worlds d-similar to f-worlds is itself c d-similar to f-worlds. Finally, the schema B for symmetry f c]h1 ? ci + f means that if a world satis es f, then we can c-discernible it from those worlds that are not (1 ? c)-similar to f-worlds. Putting it in more qualitative terms, this means that if f is true in a world, then it is strongly discernible from those worlds only little similar to f-worlds.
This shows that the epistemic and similarity interpretations of LCP w s are just two sides of a coin.
In fact, when R is viewed as an ordinary fuzzy relation, it is the similarity relation between worlds, whereas when it is viewed as a collection of possibility distributions f w j w 2 Wg, it indeed re ects the epistemic possibilities of an agent. Thus, under the semantics, the more similar to f-worlds a world is, the more possible an agent consider f is true. Consequently, the semantics of LCP allows us to do epistemic uncertain reasoning and the similarity-based one in the same framework.
Another point we would like to consider is the di erence between possible worlds and interpretations. We have mentioned the signi cance of the di erence in Sec 2.3.2, however, the similarity interpretation provide a concrete example to illustrate it.
Example 4 Consider a statement p=\X is A" in the interpolative reasoning example of 14], where X is a variable take its value in a domain U. Assume that U is in nite, e.g., the positive real number and that A is a subset of U. Then we have only two propositional interpretations, fpg or f:pg. However, we may have in nitely many possible worlds, each corresponding to a point in U, and the similarity between worlds is decided not only by the truth value of p, but also by the distance of the two points. In other words, we may have two worlds in both of which p is false, but one is very close to p-worlds, while the other is very far from p-worlds. Henceforth, the similarity relation on may be not su cient for some real applications
Handling partial consistency
We have mentioned previously that a recent development of possibilistic logic is the handling of partial inconsistency. Here, we will see how the general semantics can be assimilated into our framework. For the purely qualitative logics D and VN, we only need to drop the seriality and nonvacuity constraints on their models respectively. Consequently, we will use the modal logic 
?! ? _ :( 5 (f) (1) ?! : 5 (g)). The mapping 8 is modi ed such that 8 
Related Work and Further Research
There have been quite many works on the qualitative and quantitative aspects of possibilistic reasoning in the literatures. Here, we can only touch upon a very small parts of the works most closely related to the present one 8 .
In 2], instead of conditional connective !, a meta level nonmonotonic reasoning consequence j = is de ned with respect to a possibility distribution . It is shown that f j = g i (f^g) > (f^:g) i N(gjf) > 0. The property is heavily used in the proof of our main lemma. Although their conditional necessity is de ned by using the conditioning rule (1), the property holds as well for Dempster's rule.
However, since j = is a meta level construct, nested conditional is not allowed. Thus, in f j = g, f and g are restricted to the classical w s and the semantics for PL is su cient for the interpretation of f j = g. Furthermore, the underlying propositional language is assumed to be nitary.
In 13], the nitary assumption of the underlying language is lifted, and a binary connective is introduced, so the logic VA de ned there are syntactically equivalent to QPL. However, their semantics is the absolute sphere model in 33]. That is, a model is a triplet hW; ; V i, where is a preference relation on W. Since there is just one preference relation for the whole model instead of each world, the semantics is di erent with that presented here.
Both the papers cited in the preceding paragraphs are restricted to the discussion of the qualitative aspect of possibilistic reasoning, so the mechanisms described there can not represent quantitative measures directly. On the other hand, another logic similar to QML is proposed in 8]. The logic is called lattice-based graded logic. In that logic, the modal operators c] are formed for all c from a lattice structure instead of the interval 0; 1], so the possibility distribution w in the semantics for QML is generalized to L-fuzzy sets 23] in graded logic. The graded logic is more general than QML in some rough sense 9 . Though the graded logic can not be tted into the present framework completely since the semantics used here is restricted by using 0; 1]-valued possibility distributions, we can easily imange how to generalize QPL to the lattice-based case. However, it is not clear yet how the Dempster rule can be generalized for the de nition of lattice-based conditional possibility distributions because we lack the division operation in a lattice. Thus, how to incorporate the lattice based multimodal logic into the present framework remains an interesting theoretical problem.
It is also interesting to compare the present framework with that proposed by Boutilier 3, 4, 5, 6] . He introduce the logic CO whose syntax is the extension of propositional language by two modal operators 2 and 2 and a CO-model is a triplet hW; R; V i, where R is a transitive and connected binary relation on W. The truth set of 2 f is de ned by fw : 8u((w; u) 6 2 R ) u 2 jfj)g: Since R is a ranked relation, it is apparent a PL model hW; R; V i can be changed into a CO model by letting xRy i (x) (y) for all x; y 2 W, and vice versa for nite models. Thus the CO semantics is an absolute one. Furthermore, CO logic only allows qualitative w s. In particular, f g in QPL can be An interesting development is that probability can be introduced into CO-model so that an alternative way to combining qualitative and quantitative approaches for uncertainty reasoning is provided 6]. The resultant model is called counterfactual probability model(CPM). A CPM model is a tuple hW; ; V; i where hW; ; V i is just a PL model and is a probability measure on W. For any w f 2 L, de ne Pl(f) as the set of most possible f-worlds. That is, w 2 Pl M (f) i w j = f and for all u 2 W, if u j = f, then (w) (u). Then the counterfactual probability of g given f is de ned as P(g " f) = (Pl(f) \ jgj) (Pl(f)) :
The di erence between CPM logic and LCP is that possibility distributions serve only qualitative purpose in CPM while probability is not considered in LCP at all. Therefore, how to add probability to LCP is still an open question. This may be a combination of LCP models and those proposed by Fagin and Halpern for probabilistic reasoning 20].
In 25], a temporal logic essentially equivalent to CO, called MTL is proposed, where the modal operators 2 and $ 2 are replaced by H andĜ respectively. Thus, in the logic,Ĝf means that in the present or future, f always holds, while Hf means that in the past, f always holds. A comparative structure, as they call it, is just a many-valued CO model written as hW; ; V i, where is a ranked relation and V is a truth assignment V : W PV ! T with the truth value set T = f0; 1 n ; 2 n ; : : :; 1g. The truth valuation V is extended to the whole temporal language by the following equations V (w; Hf) = inf u<w V (u; f); V (w;Ĝf) = inf w u V (u; f): The de nition of QPL w f g in terms of temporal operators is the same as above by using CO modal operators. Therefore, MTL may be seen as a many-valued version of CO. Its semantics is thus absolute and qualitative in the reasoning about uncertainty. However, it possesses the capability of quantitative reasoning about vagueness or partial truth by its many-valued semantics. The addition of many-valued aspects to LCP will be a worthwhile research topic.
In 28], nite CO models are used to construct a modal interpretation for possibility theory. They and it is clear that M and N M are the possibility and necessity measures associated with . In fact, we use the result implicitly in proving the equivalence of QPL and VN, where we claim that a nite p-model can be constructed from a nite s-model(see Lemma 3 (2)). The result here provides a concrete technique to such construction.
Conclusion
We have proposed a uniform logic that can reason about quantitative and qualitative uncertainty based on possibility theory. Instead of combining QPL and QD in a modular way, we use Dempster's conditioning rule to provide the semantics for the conditional necessity formulas so that we can also reason about the conditional possibility and necessity measures quantitatively. We show that sublogic relations hold between the di erent qualitative and quantitative logics appeared previously in the literatures. The general framework is then shown to be useful in formulating nonmonotonic and similarity-based consequence relations.
In this concluding section, we emphasize again the shift of absolute semantics from possibilistic reasoning to LCP play the key role in our work. The semantic shift facilitates the epistemic or doxastic interpretation of necessity measures and justify the use of nested modalities. The use of nested modalities improve the expressive power of the original PL, as our examples show. This also makes it easy to represent defaults about uncertain beliefs when applied to nonmonotonic reasoning and to express the properties of similarity relations when applied to graded reasoning.
Because the main concern of this paper is a uniform semantic framework, we do not develop a proof theory for LCP. However, we exhibit an axiomatic system for LCP in the appendix. The soundness of the system can be readily constructed. However, the completeness is not established yet. The main di culty lies in the in niteness of the language. First, the compactness theorem has failed in QML 34]. We can easily nd an in nite set of w s that is unsatis able and each of its nite subsets is, so we will only try to prove that S j = f i S`f when S is nite. Then the techniques for proving the completeness of conditional logic 7] can be adopted. However, the numerical characteristic of possibility distribution adds further complexity, so it may be necessary to combine the method provided in 20]. The detail of the proof will be left for further research. f g h f(h=g) , where f(h=g) is a result of replacing some subformulas of f of form g by h
